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HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY

Assessing National Human Rights
Performance:A Theoretical Framework*
jack Donnelly
RhodaE. Howard
Comparative quantitative assessment of human rights is hampered by the
length of the list of internationally recognized rights. Not only is the list so
long that it is hard to imagine gathering adequate data without an army of
researchers (the International Human Rights Covenants contain more than
thirty substantive articles, encompassing at least twice as many separate
rights),but the results of such a comprehensive effort would almost certainly
be overwhelming and bewildering in their complexity. In this article we try
to narrow the list of rights concerning which it is necessary to gather data
by establishing a theoretical framework for assessing a state's human rights
performance. We identify a relatively small set of ten essential rights that
separately are intrinsically essential and together provide good proxies for
almost all other rights. An assessment of national performance on these ten
rights,we argue, will approximate a comprehensive assessment of a country's
overall human rights record.

A "SHORT-LIST"OF RIGHTS
Our "short list" of ten rights can be grouped into four categories:
* "Survival"rights, which guarantee individual existence: rights to life,
food and health care.
* "Membership" rights, which assure one an equal place in society:
family rights and the prohibition of discrimination.

* We thank Philip Alston, Peter Baehr, David Forsythe,James Hathaway, William Keech, Bert
Lockwood, Kim Nossal, CranfordPratt,Kathleen Pritchard,John Vincent, Jane Vock, Claude
Welch, James White and Gordon Whitaker for comments on an earlier draft.
Human Rights Quarterly 10 (1988) 214-248 o 1988 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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* "Protection"rights,which guard the individual against abuses of power
the
state: rights to habeas corpus and an independent judiciary.
by
* "Empowerment" rights, which provide the individual with control
over the course of his or her life, and in particular,control over (not merely
protection against) the state: rights to education, a free press, and freedom
of association.
This list implies no hierarchy of rights. Quite the contrary, a recurring
theme in what follows is the interdependence of all human rights. Survival
rights, listed first, are no more, and no less, basic or important than empowerment rights, listed last. Although no rights can be enjoyed unless one
is alive, the right to life has no moral priority; it may be a prerequisite to
enjoying other rights, but that does not make it a "higher" right. Likewise,
although we argue below that a free press and freedom of association are
most effective in securing political guarantee of other rights, that gives these
rights at most a political, not a moral priority. Furthermore,these ten rights
are not necessarily more important than other human rights For example,
we argue that family rights, a free press, and freedom of association can
stand as proxies for the right to religion, but this does not imply that they
are of higher moral value.
We claim only a methodological priorityfor these rights:taken together
they can stand as measures of performance for virtually the entire list of
internationally recognized human rights. Because of certain logical, political,
and moral linkages among the rights discussed below, we contend that a
state which protects these rightsprobably will be found to protect most other
human rights as well. If this is true, national assessments will be greatly
simplified. Such simplification, and the more coherent direction it can provide to research, is the ultimate aim and justification of our theoretical work
here.
Clearly our project implies acceptance of the cross-national normative
consensus represented by the International Bill of Human Rights (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [1948] and the International Human
Rights Covenants [1966]). For practical purposes, the endorsement of this
list by virtually all states, whatever their shortcomings in living up to its
demands, precludes using any other list. Fortunately,the list is a remarkably
good one. It includes a wide range of civil and political as well as economic,
social, and cultural rights. Furthermore,as we have argued elsewhere' the
full list can easily be derived from the principles of autonomy and moral
equality and it provides a plausible account of the prerequisites of a life of
dignity-at least in comtemporary state societies, which will be our exclusive
focus here. The International Bill of Human Rights may not be complete or

1. Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly, "Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Regimes," American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986): 805-806.
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fully adequate (e.g., nonarbitrary capital punishment is allowed and the
rights of homosexuals are not guaranteed) but, henceforth, we will treat it
as specifying the rights that must be encompassed in any comprehensive
assessment of national practices.
In addition to its intrinsic significance, this project is important because
of the role human rights assessments have come to play in foreign and
domestic policy. A number of Western countries, such as the United States,
Norway, and the Netherlands,2 now tie foreign aid more or less closely to
human rights performance, and the general tenor of relations can be greatly
affected by perceptions of a country's human rights practices. No less importantly, a country's own human rights practices can raise major domestic
political issues. Assessments based on information systematically gathered
and presented according to a sound theoretical framework may allow policymakers the opportunity to take into account most of the essential information.
Quantitative indicators and evaluative assessments of various sorts are
already being demanded, produced and used, and in the United States at
least, have been formally incorporated into the foreign policy process.3 Social
scientists thus have an obligation to provide analysts and policymakers with
the clearest possible indicators. The essential first step in this process is the
identification of a manageable, theoretically defensible set of human rights
with which to assess national human rights practices.4

2. See, for example, Tor Skalnes and Jan Egeland, ed., Human Rightsin Developing Countries
1986 (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986); and Peter Baehr, "Concern for Development Aid and Fundamental Human Rights: The Dilemma Faced by the Netherlands,"
Human Rights Quarterly 4 (Spring 1982): 39-52.
3. Judith Innes de Neufville, "Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examinationof
the State DepartmentCountry Reports,"Human RightsQuarterly8 (November 1986): 681699; and Gloria Valencia-Weber and Robert J. Weber, "El Salvador: Methods Used to
Document Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 8 (November 1986), 731-770.
4. We are particularlytroubled by the tendencies in the recent literatureon measuring human
rightsto use arbitrarydefinitions and to make questionable use of data developed for other
purposes. Forexample, David L. Banks ("The Analysis of Human Rights Data Over Time,"
Human Rights Quarterly8 [November 1986]: 654-655) claims to be talking about human
rights but in fact simply takes "political freedom" to be equivalent to human rightswithout
providing any argument at all. Kenneth A. Bollen ("Political Rights and Political Liberties
in Nations: An Evaluationof Human RightsMeasures," Human RightsQuarterly8 [November 1986]: 567-591) advocates use of his political democracy index, developed for other
purposes, although the link between this index and internationallyrecognized human rights
remains obscure. The use of the PQLI(Physical Quality of Life Index) as a general measure
of economic and social rights performance (see, for example, Kathleen Pritchard,"Comparative Human Rights:An IntegrativeExplanation,"Policy Studies Journal 15 [September
1986]: 110-122) also is troublesome, because the variables included in the measure are
strongly intercorrelated; it does not measure distributional inequalities in a society; and it
is only vaguely linked to internationally accepted human rights. For a good review of
problems in measuring human rights performance, especially with data gathered for other
purposes, see Robert Justin Goldstein, "The Limitation of Using Quantitative Data in
Studying Human RightsAbuses," Human Rights Quarterly 8 (November 1986): 607-627.
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TABLE
1
SurvivalRights
Proxy for

Right to
LIFE(D3, C6)

Torture(D5, C7)

FOOD (D25, E11)

Property (D17)

HEALTHCARE(D25, E12)

Social Security (D22, E9)
Mothers and Children (D25)

Note: The source of each right in the International Bill of Human Rights is indicated in parentheses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E =
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights).

The following four sections examine in detail our ten key rights. Each
section begins with a brief discussion of the general importance of that
category of human rights and a table that specifies the sources of each right
in the Covenants and the Universal Declaration and indicates the other rights
for which it can be used as a proxy. Each right is then discussed, with
attention given to its intrinsic importance, the ways it may stand for rights
not included on the short list, and its interaction with other rights. Finally,
we discuss a handful of internationally recognized human rightsthat are not
adequately encompassed by our short list.
SURVIVALRIGHTS
Because survival is prerequisiteto all other human rights,rightsthat guarantee
survival must be included in any short list of human rights.We have identified
three key survival rights: the right to life, which we interpret as a right to
protection against death at the hands of another (especially the state); the
rightto food, the rightto the minimum supplies of sustenance; and the right
to health care. These rights, and the rights for which they may be deemed
proxies are set out in Table 1.

The Right to Life
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states
that "every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarilydeprived of his life." The right
to life, expressed in similar terms in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration,
is probably the single least controversial human right--in theory. In practice,

218

HUMANRIGHTSQUARTERLY

Vol. 10

however, it is regularly, often flagrantly and systematically, violated. Leo
Kuper has argued, with some justification, that "[the right to life] is one of
the most abused of human rights-abused above all by governments, the
political custodians and protectors of human rights."5
Some commentators argue for a very broad interpretation of the right
to life as encompassing numerous other rights explicitly recognized elsewhere in the International Bill.6 We prefer to stick closely to the words of
the Covenant and focus on legal protection against arbitrarydeprivations of
life. This requires state guarantees of minimal conditions of social order,
protection against private murders, and protection against execution by the
state or its agents.
Social order is often taken for granted, but when it breaks down even
the framework for existence collapses. Life, however, does not simply degenerate into an atomistic war of all against all. Rather,organized elements,
often more or less closely attached to the state or its remnants, are loosed
on society, placing the lives of individuals at risk not so much from their
neighbors as from gangs of armed men who replace legitimate social order
with personal rule based on force. In an extreme case, such as contemporary
Lebanon, the state gives way to ethnic, religious, and political private militias.7 Protection against such a world requires a state capable of untempered
and illegitimate use of force, providing law and order. Lifecan be guaranteed
only when the "politics" of force and terror is replaced by more or less
legitimate political order.
In addition to providing minimal social order, the right to life requires
the state to protect individuals against attacks on their person either by fellow
citizens or the state and its agents. Laws prohibiting murder and violent
assaults are necessary, along with a judiciary and police force capable of
enforcing such prohibitions.
The state must also assure that its own officials or agents are prevented
from killing civilians (and each other).8In recent years, such killing has taken
5. Leo Kuper,"Genocideand Mass Killing:Illusionand Reality,"in The Rightto Lifein
International
Law,ed. B. G. Ramcharan
(Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoff,1985).
6. See, for example,B. G. Ramcharan,
"TheConceptand Dimensionsof the Rightto Life,"
in Ramcharan
ed., note 5 above.
7. Douglas duCharme, "Lebanon," in International Handbook on Human Rights, ed. Jack

Donnellyand RhodaE. Howard(Westport,CT:GreenwoodPress,1987).
8. AlthoughArticle6 of the Civiland PoliticalCovenantdoes explicitlyallow capitalpunishmentin limitedcircumstances-an allowanceunderscoredby the prohibitiononly of
of life-we wouldarguethatconsiderations
of moralityand logical
deprivations
"arbitrary"
consistencyrequireprohibitingjudicialas well as extrajudicialexecutions.Evenin cases
of the most heinous crimes, we would argue that simple logical consistencyrequires
prohibitioneven of nonarbitrary,
judiciallysanctionedexecutions.The idea of human
rights-equalandinalienablerightsheldbyeach personsimplyas a humanbeing-implies
an inherentand irreduciblemoralvalue in each personthatthe state mustrespect.The
deathpenalty,even if applied"fairly,"is morallyproblematicbecauseof its completeand
finaldenialof thisvalue.Ongoingdiscussionsconcerningthe draftingof a SecondOptional
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on gruesome new forms, as witnessed by the rise of death squads and
"disappearances" in LatinAmerica and elsewhere, and the practice of "salvaging" in the Philippines.9 These have not, however, supplanted more
conventional practices of mass murderand genocide. Inaddition to relatively
well reported cases such as Kampuchea (1975-78), and the excesses of
dictators such as Bokassa in the CentralAfrican "Empire"or Macias Nguema
in EquatorialGuinea, there are numerous other examples, such as the systematic massacres of Indians in Paraguay and Guatemala, and two waves
of horrible mass murders in less than twenty years in Indonesia: in 1965
through 1966, when roughly half a million leftists were killed, and in the
late seventies and early eighties, when at least one-quarter, and probably
closer to half, of the population of East Timor died when it was forcibly
incorporated into Indonesia.'1 Significant numbers of official and quasiofficial murders have occurred in literally dozens of other countries.11
No guarantee of the rightto life can ever be absolutely certain. Nevertheless, a state that does not take action to prevent murder and violent crime
is not discharging its responsibilities with respect to the right to life. For
example, the failure of the government to prosecute a single person for the
disappearance and death of even one of the tens of thousands of Salvadoran
victims of death squads, and the failure of some urban police forces in the
United States to provide adequate protection to selected neighborhoods and
public housing projects, represent clear violations of the right of life.
The right to life requires actual as well as legislative protection. In some
cases, scarcity of resources may take the prevention of certain kinds of
violations too costly for the state to act effectively. For example, at some
point the marginal utility of increased police protection becomes so small
Protocol to the Covenant prohibiting capital punishment (See U.N. Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1987/104 and UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/20) may indicate a turn
of international law and opinion in this direction.
9. See Amnesty International USA, Disappearances: A Workbook (New York: Amnesty International, 1981); Edy Kaufman and Patricia Weiss Fagen, "ExtrajudicialExecutions: An
Insight into the Global Dimensions of a Human RightsViolation," Human Rights Quarterly
3 (November 1981): 81-100; Richard P. Claude, "The Philippines," in Donnelly and
Howard ed., note 7 above; and Report of the WorkingGroup on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, UN document E/CN.4/1987/15.
10. EricWolf, "Murderof the Ache," in Genocide in Paraguay, ed. Philip Arens (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1976); Gordon L. Bowen, "The Political Economy of State Terrorism: Barrierto Human Rights in Guatemala," in Human Rights and Third World Development, ed. George W. Shepherd and Ved P. Nanda (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1985). A. Kohen and J. Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor
(London: TAPOL,1979); James Dunn, Timor:A People Betrayed (Milton, Qld: Jacaranda,
1983); and C. Budiardjo and L. Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Press,
1984).
11. See, for example, Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, ed., The State as Terrorist:The
Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1984); Amnesty International, Political Killings by Governments (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1983); and UN document E/CN.4/1987/20.
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that even very wealthy societies are likely to find better uses for scarce public
resources. But such limiting cases-which exist for all rights-must be the
exception only. Protection of the right to life requires not only that state
officials refrain from threatening the lives of citizens, but also that police,
prosecutors, courts, and any other necessary institutions,take positive action
to assure that citizens are safe from threats of violence, regardless of their
source.
The right to life may be a prerequisite to the enjoyment of all other
rights. It is, however, such a minimal guarantee of human dignity-if the
right to life is the only right guaranteed in contemporary state societies, life
may not necessarily be short, but it may be solitary, poor, nasty, and brutishthat it does not serve as much of a proxy or indicator for other human rights.
The one partial exception is the right to protection against torture, which
can result in death, and in every case involves the treatment of individuals
as less than human beings. States may torture citizens while protecting their
right to life; indeed, there are state-employed physicians in countries such
as Chile and the Soviet Union whose job is to ensure that torturerscan inflict
the maximum amount of pain without actually killing their victims.12 But a
moral and political ethos that rejects as illegitimate the taking of life (as
opposed to mere judgments of expediency about when or when not to torture
someone to death) will be one that for similar reasons rejects torture as a
legitimate instrument of state policy.

The Right to Food
Article 11 of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights recognizes "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,"
as well as "the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger." The
right to food is generally considered to be the "economic" equivalent of the
right to life-death from starvation is no less death than if one is shot-and
many of the arguments made above apply here too. For example, guaranteeing the right to food requires analogous protections of social order as
well as protection against both private and quasi-official theft of land and
other resources.

12. David Kowalewski, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," in Donnelly and Howard ed.,
note 7 above; Eric Stover and Elena O. Nightingale, Breaking Bodies and Minds (San
Francisco: W. Freeman, 1986); Eric Stover, The Open Secret: Tortureand the Medical
Profession in Chile (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, July 1987); and UN document E/CN.4/1987/13, paras. 23-34. On the problem of
torturemore generally, see Amnesty International,Torturein the Eighties(London:Amnesty
international Publications, 1984).
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Although it is often argued that the right to food is more difficult for
states to honor than the right to life, especially in poor countries, all reasonable assessments suggest that there is plenty of food in the world for
everyone. Moreover, the right to food is at issue not only in poor countries,
but also in rich ones such as the United States.'3 The availability of food is
a matter of equitable inter- and intra-national distribution, less a matter of
resource scarcity than political choice.'4 It is also increasingly a matter of
access to land, or the deprivation of such access. Fromthe forcible removal
of peasants in rebel areas of Ethiopia to the marginalization of peasants in
favor of multinational agribusiness in Central America, deprivation of land
use is often the key to deprivation of food.'"
Therefore, we suggest an inversion of the standard liberal account of
the link between the right to food and the right to property (which is also
discussed in Section 6 below). We agree with Shue'6 that the right to food
or subsistence "trumps"the right to property, as implied, perhaps, by the
elimination of the right to property from the 1966 Covenants, despite its
inclusion in the 1948 Universal Declaration. Nevertheless, in a world still
inhabited by billions of peasants, protection of a family's property or use
rights in land may well constitute one of the best protections of the right to
food. Similarly, the redistribution of land from large holders to peasant
families or cooperatives may facilitate enjoyment of the right to food. Even
very poor states, which usually lack the administrative capacity to ensure
by direct action that all their citizens are fed, can help to protect the right
by creating or preserving legal protection of citizens' access to land.
This argument can be extended to individuals' rights to "property" in
the industrialized world, where personal and social wages are the closest
many citizens come to the ownership of "property".In such societies, state
policies such as minimum wage or guaranteed income legislation can protect
this essential personal "property"and ensure that citizens can obtain food.

13. Asbjorn Eide, Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN document

MarthaH. Good, "Freedomfrom Want:The Failureof United
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23;
StatesCourtsto ProtectSubsistenceRights,"HumanRightsQuarterly6 (August1984):
355-65; and RobertJustinGoldstein,"The UnitedStatesof America,"in Donnellyand
Howarded., note 7 above.
14. CherylChristensen,TheRightto Food:How to Guarantee(New York:InstituteforWorld
Order,1978);and IndependentCommissionon International
DevelopmentIssues[Brandt
Commission], North-South: A Program for Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983):

chap. 5.

15. Peter Niggli, Ethiopia: Deportations and Forced-LabourCamps ([West] Berlin: Berliner
Missionwerk, January 1986); Jim Doble, Resettlement in Ethiopia: An Independent Study
into the Plight of Ethiopia's Refugees (Toronto: Energy Probe, 1986); and Charles D.

Brockett,"The Rightto Food and United States Policy in Guatemala,"Human Rights
Quarterly6 (August1984): 366-380.

16. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton:

PrincetonUniversityPress,1980): 125.
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The Right to Health Care
For life to be anything other than the mere minimum of brutish existence,
access to health care is essential. Article 12 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes "the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health." The phrase "highest attainable," like the general obligation in Article
2(1) of states parties "to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights
to the maximum of its available resources," suggests not merely a long term
and progressively rising requirement but also immediate demands specific
to the resources available to each state.'7
The rightto health care requires that all medically unnecessary physical
suffering be prevented. By "unnecessary" we mean physical suffering that
readily available national and international'8 health care systems could prevent. Forexample, World Health Organization "packages" of immunization
and public health measures have succeeded, in countries such Nicaragua,
in reducing infant mortality rates very quickly.'9
The right to health care is a good partial proxy for the rights of mothers
and children to special protection. For example, in the Soviet Union the
physically abusive manner in which the state provides birthcontrol, through
multiple abortions instead of contraceptive devices, has resulted in an unprecedented rise in the infant mortality rate in the 1970s.20 Similarly, in the
United States-perhaps the only Western industrialized democracy not to
provide universal child allowances, job-protected maternity leaves, and taxsupported universal prenatal care-infant mortalityrates in some black ghettos and ruralareas now rivalor exceed those of many ThirdWorld countries.2'
In addition, adequate health care cannot be made available to all members of a society without a comprehensive social security package. The aged,
infirm, and unemployed, as well as mothers and children, require social
security protection to maintain their health. Thus, a state that is genuinely
committed to providing the basic right to health probably will also provide
a full range of social security protections.
Adequate safeguards of the rights to food and health care are likely to
be mutually reinforcing. Most obviously, malnutrition can be an important
factor in susceptibility to many diseases. Conversely, a population well
protected against common debilitating diseases by a program of preventive
17. Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and CulturalRights, UN document E/CN.4/1987/17 Annex, paras. 21-28. (Reprinted
in Human Rights Quarterly 9 [May 1987]: 122-135.)
18. Ibid., para. 26, 29-34.
19. Catherine Gander, "Nicaragua," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above.
20. Kowalewski, note 12 above, and Cullen Murphy, "Watching the Russians,"Atlantic 251
(February1983): 51.
21. Goldstein, note 13 above.
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public health care may be better able to satisfy its food needs. Forexample,
effective programsagainst water-borne diseases such as schistosomiasis (bilharzia) could prevent literally hundreds of thousands from becoming needlessly disabled, and thus enable them to cultivate their own food.

MEMBERSHIPRIGHTS
The protection of survival rights alone guarantees only the crudest anomic
existence, a life unfit for a human being; to exist as a human being, one
must exist as part of a community. From Aristotle to Marx it has been
commonplace, yet absolutely essential to note that man is a social animal.
More recently, it has been noted that women and children, too, are part of
the community.
The destruction of families and communities ranks high on every sociological list of state actions that "ordinary"people consider to be abusive
of human rights.22Families are normally a part of communities, sharing
common ethnic features, including religious beliefs, social customs, languages, and myths of origin or ancestry. Indeed, in many preindustrial societies families and communities are one, since myths of extended kinship
tie nuclear families into largerclans or tribes. In contemporary nation-states,
symbols of patriotism and citizenship often substitute for these preindustrial
ties to the community.
The importance of community can also be seen in twentieth-century
nationalist political movements and, more recently, in efforts to protect or
resurrectthe rightsof indigenous hunting-gatheringand agriculturalsocieties
in countries such as Brazil.23Both rest on a desire to protect a community
and its way of life from the state, other elements of society, or both.
There are also movements demanding full inclusion in civil society for
socially-defined "outsiders." In the Western world in recent decades, these
have included racial and ethnic minorities, women, and most recently homosexuals. The struggle of lower caste groups in India for social and economic,
as well as political, inclusion in society presents an especially striking example of recent movements to overcome invidious definitions of communal
membership.
We have identified two key membership rights, the protection of the

22. BarringtonMoore Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970): 2; and Peter Berger, "Are Human
Rights Universal," Commentary 64 (September 1977): 62.
23. Marc Pallemaerts, "Development, Conservation and Indigenous Rights in Brazil," Human
Rights Quarterly 8 (August 1986), 374-400. See also Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Volume V: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add. 4.
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TABLE
2
MembershipRights
Right to

Proxy for

FAMILY
(D12, D16, E10, C17, C18, C23)

Social Security (D22, E9)
Culture (D27, E15)
Religion (D18, C18)
Minority Culture (C27)
Rights of the Child (C24)
Freedom of Movement (D13, C12)
Education (D26, E13, E14)

NONDISCRIMINATION
(D1, D2, E2, E3, C2, C3)
EQUALPROTECTION
(D7, C14, C26)

Slavery (D4, C8)
Legal Recognition (D6, C16)
Nationality (D15)
Religion (D18, C18)
Minority Culture (C27)
Rights of the Child (C24)
Rights of Aliens (C13)
Debtors Prison (C11)
Political Participation (D21, C25)

Note: The source of each right in the InternationalBill of Human Rights is indicated in parentheses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E =
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights).

family and the prohibition of discrimination, which can serve as proxies for
a number of rights enumerated in Table 2.

Family Rights
Protection of the family is a recurrent theme throughout the International
Bill of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration states that "no one shall
be subjected to arbitraryinterference with his privacy, family home ..."
(Article 12), that "men and women of full age . . . have the right to marry
and to found a family" (Article 16[1]), and that "the family is the natural
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the State" (Article 16[3]). The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rightsdeclares that "the widest possible protection and
assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society" (Article 10[1]), requires special protection
for mothers before and after childbirth and for children and young persons
(Article 10[2], [3]), and grants special protections to families with respect
to education (Article13[3]). The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political
Rights also prohibits interference with the family (Article 17), guarantees
family rights in education (Article 18[4]) and reaffirmsthe social primacy of
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the family and the right to marry and to found a family (Article 23). The
pervasive presence of family rights in these documents is justified not only
by the intrinsic importance of the family but by the wide-ranging social and
political implications of protecting the institution of the family.
It is important not to romanticize the family: women frequently need
protection against abusive husbands and fathers; children often need to be
protected against violent, psychologically abusive, or negligent parents or
caretakers. Moreover, the very choice of partaking in or refusing family
relations is often denied, sometimes violently. Insuch cases, state intervention
to protect victims of familial abuse may be essential.
In a somewhat different vein, many people choose not to live in traditionally recognized family groups and others, such as homosexual couples,
find their attempts to establish new forms of households unrecognized by
society and the state. Such individuals need to be protected from state
attempts to coerce them into traditional family units-or worse, to imprison
them for their deviance. We must also rememberthat in a number of countries
the state intervenes not to protect but to undermine the family.
Labor control is one object of state interference with family relations.
In South Africa approximately one million female domestic servants are
expected to live away from their children, black miners are forced to live
in single-sex residences away from families whom they may visit only one
month of every year; and countless urban workers are forced by economic
necessity, and until 1986 by law as well, to live away from their families.
The state creates these conditions in order to ensure a supply of cheap black
labor unencumbered by the responsibilities and costs of family ties.24 In
other states, such as China, family rights are invaded when individuals are
assigned to jobs against their will, or without consideration of their family,
especially spousal, ties.
A second and increasingly common motive for state interference with
family relations is population control. In Europe and North America, politically sensitive family planning issues usually involve decisions of couples
or women to prevent conception or refuse to give birth. In many other
countries, the issue is whether they are to be permitted to give birth. South
Africa encourages birth control for blacks, while discouraging it for whites,
and has gone so far as to threaten compulsory sterilization and abortion to
reduce nonwhite birth rates.25 in India, abusive forced vasectomies, especially among the Muslim population during the Emergency (1975-77), were

24. JacklynCock, Maids and Madams: A Study in in the Politics of Exploitation(Johannesburg:

RavanPress,1980); FrederickJohnstone,"SouthAfrica,"in Donnellyand Howarded.,
note 7 above; and HaroldWolpe, "Capitalism
and CheapLabourPowerin SouthAfrica:
FromSegregationto Apartheid,"Economyand Society1 (1972):425-456.

25. Aziza Seedat, Cripplinga Nation: Health in Apartheid South Africa (London: International

Defence and Aid Fundfor SouthernAfrica,April1984): 12-13.

226

HUMANRIGHTSQUARTERLY

Vol. 10

one reason for Mrs. Gandhi's downfall.26 China's one-child campaign has
been widely resisted internally and its coercive elements have provoked
substantial international criticism. Less well-known is the enforced sterilization, often without anaesthetic, of young girls-some unmarried and childless-in Bangladesh in the 1980s.27
The issue of overpopulation is indeed a difficult one. With different
social arrangements, all of the world's five billion people could be fed.28
But new social arrangementsare not likely to emerge in the short or medium
run. Meanwhile, in many countries that do not presently meet their people's
basic needs, population growth far outstrips economic growth. In almost all
less developed countries, reduced population growth rates could contribute
significantly to increased per capita incomes, and thus, make available more
resources that might be used for satisfying basic human needs.
Family planning, however, need not be rights-abusive. Informationand
contraceptives usually can be used instead of coercive, invasive, and even
physically dangerous methods of population control such as forced abortions
or sterilization. Social security provisions can both protect, and limit the
size of, families. Old age pensions, for example, lessen the necessity of
having large numbersof children to ensure supportfortheir parents. Educating
girls reduces the riskof early pregnancy. Child welfare provisions and health
care improvements that ensure higher survival rates for infants also tend to
lower the birth rate. Protection of the family, protection of the child, and
population reduction usually can be made to coincide.29
A third, and perhaps most important, reason for the state's interference

withfamilyrelationsis thatit can operateas partof a broadereffortto subvert
private social relations, which may provide a basis of loyalty to groups and
institutions other than the state. The family is the seat of socialization. A
child absorbs values and customs primarily from the family, and with the
family participates in those religious and ethnic ritualsthat it later comes to
value as an adult, contributing to his or her sense of dignity and belonging.
Totalitarianstates in particulartry to break down all competing loyalties that
individuals might hold, creating anomic citizens whose only-and therefore
easily manipulable-sense of connection to the community is through state
created and state controlled institutions, such as party youth leagues. For
example, in the Soviet Union, children are sometimes removed from Christian families that "proselytize" them,30 not to protect children from indoc26. BarnettR. Rubin,"India,"in Donnellyand Howarded., note 7 above. Fora fictionalized
accountof thisepisode,see SalmanRushdie,Midnight'sChildren(NewYork:Knopf,1981).
27. JamesC. Seymour,"China,"in Donnellyand Howarded., note 7 above; and Shelley
Feldman,"Womenin Bangladesh,"paperpresentedat a conferenceon humanrightsin
Asia,StateUniversityof New Yorkat Buffalo,March1987.
28. See note 14 above.
29. Independent[Brandt]Commission,note 14 above, pp. 106-108.
30. Kowalewski,note 12 above.

1988

AssessingPerformance

227

trination into false or reactionary beliefs, but to secure the state's place as
the only agent or their socialization.
The possibility of this type of state interference with family relations
necessitates protection of the rightsto culture, religion, and minority culture,
respect for which can be assessed to a considerable extent by the level of
respect for family rights. No less importantis the liberty of families to choose
their children's schools. This right is sometimes exercised in ways that reinforce class privilege (e.g., "public" schools in England), ethnic bias (e.g.,
pressure for "all Dutch" schools in Holland31), or racial exclusion (e.g.,
"Christian academies" in the American South) and thus may undermine
equality and nondiscrimination. Nevertheless, to argue that there is no need
to protect the right of families to choose their children's schools is to make
the unrealistic assumption that states can always be relied on to provide
nondiscriminatory, equal and ethically acceptable education. The right to
choose one's children's schools is the right not to be required to submit
one's children to political and ethical socialization by the state. It is also
the right to preserve one's culture, religion, and language by having one's
children educated in schools that share these aspects on one's way of life.
Probably the worst invasion of family rights in the practice of spying on
families. Under Nazism, children were taught in schools to inform against
their own parents, as were children in Stalinist Russia. In communist systems,
such as Cuba, neighborhood Party units are often expected to provide the
state with information concerning families included in such units. This
method of spying was common, and effective, in China during the Cultural
Revolution.32

The effective preservationof family rights,therefore, is closely associated
with the preservationof the rightto privacy; of the rightof families to preserve
their ethnic customs, religion, and language; and of the rights of women,
children, and others who are specially protected by social security measures
(See Table 2). A state that respects the family must also protect a wide range
of related social rights.
In many states, however, families of a certain ethnic group or social
status may be well protected, while others are denied protection on the basis
of ascriptive criteria. In Japan, for example, ethnic Koreans and the descendants of those held jobs once considered defiling (such as butchers), suffer
both legal and social discrimination.33

31. We owe this exampleto PeterBaehr.
32. RobertConquest,Harvestof Despair(Edmonton:
Universityof AlbertaPress,1986);Rhoda
Rabkin,"Cuba,"in Donnellyand Howarded., note 7 above; and LiangHengand Judith
Shapiro,Son of the Revolution(New York:Knopf,1983).
33. LawrenceBeer,"Japan,"
in DonnellyandHowarded., note7 above,219; andYujiIwasawa,
HumanRightsLawon
"LegalTreatmentof Koreansin Japan:The Impactof International
JapaneseLaw,"HumanRightsQuarterly8 (May1986): 131-197.
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Moreover, while the family may be "the naturaland fundamental group

unit of society,"it is only a partof society, and it is only in the context of
society as a whole that a life of dignity is possible. The prerequisitefor social
participation is recognition of one's membership in society as an individual,
regardless of, as well as respectful of, one's family allegiances. Thus, the
right to family must be supplemented by the right to nondiscrimination.

Nondiscrimination
There are two aspects of the right to nondiscrimination. Article 2 of the
Universal Declaration and Article 2 of both Covenants recognize that individuals are entitled to enjoy all enumerated rights on an equal basis and
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status." In addition, both Article 7 of the Declaration and Article 26 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsstate that "all persons are equal before
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection
of the law." Both the general principle of the equal enjoyment of all rights
and the special legal principle of equal protection support the conclusion
that from a human rights perspective, human dignity is fully respected only
where individuals are treated as fully equal members of society.
Race, color, and sex are accidents of birth, ascribed criteria over which
the individual has no control. Religion is also frequently considered to be
given to a child at birth, although changes in religion are commonplace.
The principle underlying prohibitions of discrimination on such grounds is
clear: the moral worth of human beings is not in any way connected with
such natural accidents; no one should suffer for characteristics over which
he or she has no control. Social status ascribed at birth, which likewise rests
on circumstances beyond the individual's control, is also prohibited grounds
for discrimination. For example, victims of India's caste system-those at
the very bottom who are still socially, although not legally, viewed as "untouchables"-should be protected from discrimination.34
Protecting full membership in society for all, however, also requires
prohibitingdiscrimination on the grounds of certain acquired characteristics.
Forexample, political opinions and property are at least partially under the
individual's control. The Covenants' prohibition of nondiscrimination on
these grounds is an assertion that individuals are fully and equally entitled
to enjoy all human rights regardless of the choices they make concerning
these important aspects of their lives. There is an irreducible minimum of
34. Rubin, note 26 above; and Jack Donnelly, "Traditional Values Versus Universal Human
Rights: Caste in India," paper presented at a conference on human rights in Asia, State
University of New Yorkat Buffalo, March 1987.
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respect to which one is entitled, including in particular the full and equal
enjoyment of all human rights, regardless of decisions one makes in these
specified areas of protected choice.
The rightnot to be discriminated against on the basis of property-which
sets the context for Article 11 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
stating that "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability
to fulfill a contractual obligation" (prohibition of debtors' prisons)-is particularly interesting in this regard. Taken seriously, this provision would
protect not only persons of real or alleged "bourgeois" origin in radically
communist regimes, but also the poor in all societies. Its point is that one's
human dignity, one's intrinsic worth as a person, supersedes the law of
contract or normative evaluations of the individual's responsibility to take
the consequences of his or her own actions. Even if the poor are poor as a
result of their own activities, they remain equally entitled to enjoy all human
rights; even if perfect equality of opportunity existed, those who failed to
take advantage of the opportunities available to them would still be protected
from discrimination on the basis on property.
Furthermore,the principle of nondiscrimination prohibits such practices
as "pawning" (giving oneself or a relative to another person for a certain
period of time in payment of a debt), which occurs in some African societies,
or debt peonage or bonded labor, which persists in India. A person should
not be treated as a piece of property, even for a limited period of time, as
a consequence of economic misfortune, or even improvidence.35
As indicated in Table 2, the right to nondiscrimination can stand for a
variety of other rights as well. A state properly abiding by the principles of
nondiscrimination and equal protection almost certainly will also protect
the rightto legal recognition and the right not to be held in slavery. Assuming
that political participation is permitted, it will also protect the right to participate in political activities and to seek and hold office on a nondiscriminatory basis. A policy of nondiscrimination, along with effective protections
of the rightto a family, should also protect the rightsof children, who would
have rights commensurate with their status as minors. In conjunction with
35. Banningdiscrimination
on the basisof acquiredcharacteristics
widensthe scope of political
action in pursuitof rights,and suggeststhe need to extendthe list of prohibitedgrounds
in Article2 of the Covenants.Thegay liberationmovement,forexample,is notcompletely
analogousto the civil rightsor women'smovements,which are pursuingequal rightsfor
on the basisof biologicalbirthcharacteristics
over which
personssufferingdiscrimination
they have no control.Althoughhomosexualityseems to be at least in partthe resultof
hereditaryor environmentalfactorsbeyondthe individual'scontrol,manyopponentsof
equal rightsfor homosexualsstill assumethat sexual preferenceis a matterof personal
choice, andsomegayactivists,especiallyin the lesbianrightsmovement,agreethatchoice
is involved. But even if homosexualitywere demonstratedto be an acquired(chosen)
ratherthan ascribed(uncontrollable)
characteristic,the precedentsnoted above suggest
that it shouldnot be the basisfordiscrimination-evenif the choice deeply offendslarge
sectorsof the populationand traditionalcommunityvalues.
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TABLE
3
ProtectionRights
Right to
HABEASCORPUS (D9, C9)

INDEPENDENTJUDICIARY
(D10, C14)

Proxy for
Torture(D5, C7)
ArbitraryArrest (D9, C9)
Ex Post Facto Laws (D11, Cl 5)
Presumption of Innocence (D11, C14)
Rights of Detainees (C10)
Political Participation (D21, C25)
Torture(D5, C7)
Legal Remedy (D8, C2)
Access to Courts (D10, C14)
Political Participation (D21, C25)

Note: The source of each right in the InternationalBill of Human Rights is indicated in parentheses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E =
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights).

the protection of family, and freedom of the press and association, a policy
of nondiscrimination would protect the right to practice one's own religion
and preserve one's culture. Furthermore, if the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of property were taken seriously, it would serve as a
further protection of the right to food and adequate health care. It might
also ensure that if discriminatory laws and practices against, for example,
blacks in South Africa or the United States, were ended, previously existing
forms of racial discrimination could not simply be transformed into a new
class discrimination with a substantial racial overlap.
PROTECTIONRIGHTS
Even if a state were to protect survival rights and guarantee to all full rights
of membership in society, individuals might still be subject to a wide range
of abuses by the state, including arbitraryarrest and detention and prosecution under ex post facto laws, so long as such practices did not reflect
invidious discrimination. A life of dignity thus requires the observance of
what we have termed "protection" rights. They might also be called legal
or judicial rights, for their principal thrust is to establish the rule of law and
to provide judicial review of governmental action.
We contend that the rightsto habeas corpus and an independent judiciary
serve as indicators for this fairly diverse set of rights. As these rights are
familiar and relatively uncontroversial, our exposition will be brief. Since
they are closely connected, representing two sides of the process of judicial
review, they will be discussed together.
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration, in its entirety, reads "No one
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shall be subjected to arbitraryarrest, detention or exile." Article 9 of the
InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights adds, among other provisions, the rights to be informed of the charges when arrested, to challenge
the lawfulness of any detention and receive compensation for unlawful arrest
or detention, to be released from custody while awaiting trial, and to be
brought before a judge and tried "within a reasonable time" or be released.
The right of habeas corpus, which requires the state to bring detainees
before a judge or court to determine the lawfulness of their detention, lies
at the heart of these protections,36 which seek to ensure that the criminal
law does not become an arbitraryinstrument of oppression in the hands of
the state, especially the executive. To ensure that the writ of habeas corpus
is not just a formality, judges must have the power to order the release of
prisoners; it is not sufficient, as is provided for in most Preventive Detention
Acts in English-speakingAfrica,that they merely "advise" the Presidentabout
the legitimacy of detention.37 Moreover, judicial review of detentions must
also be used to enforce the requirement of a speedy trial, to prevent anyone
from languishing in detention merely at the behest of the executive agencies
of the state.
To assure procedural regularity,even by the right to habeas corpus, the
judiciary must be independent and effective. The judge to whom detentions
must be justified must be an officer of the law, not a dependent agent of
those whose behavior he or she is required to review. As Article 14 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights puts it, "everyone shall be entitled
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law." Article 10 of the Universal Declaration uses
almost the same words. In Anglo-American political thought, this principle
has usually been expressed in terms of the separation of powers; in the
United States, the language of checks and balances is also regularly used.
The need for protection rightsarises from the paradoxical relation of the
state to the enjoyment of human rights. The state is indispensible to the
effective implementation of all human rights, as we have seen in some detail
with respect to those rights discussed above. The concentration of power
requiredto assure such protection, however, poses perhaps the greatest threat
to those rights.Since the state cannot be eliminated without disastrous human
rights consequences, it must be controlled.
Partof that control must come from outside the government, from "society." Such "external" control in the form of empowerment rights, is discussed below. But there must also be "internal" checks on governmental
36. Habeas corpus is a distinctly Anglo-American practice. There are, however, roughly analogous provisions in many other legal systems. We use "habeas corpus" here not in the
strictest technical sense of the term but rather as a convenient verbal shorthand for "the
right to protection against arbitraryarrest or detention."
37. Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1986): 152-159.
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power that are built into the day-to-day operation of the state. These are
provided by what we call protection rights.
The most effective internalchecks requirethe separation of the functions
and powers of government and the conferral of independence on the courts
so that they may watch over and review the actions of other branches of
the government. If such internal controls are to be effective, the judiciary
must be a genuinely independent branch of government, a point underscored
by the attacks on the courts conducted in most newly established repressive
regimes, such as Marcos' assault on the judiciary during the consolidation
of martial law in the Philippines.38
The preservation of human rights, however, requires that courts have
the ability to do more than form independent judgments of whether or not
there has been an infraction of the law. Unless a judiciary has the power to
overrule the actions of the executive on substantive, as well as procedural,
grounds-for example, the power to interpretand apply the constitution in
order to overturn rights-abusive statutes-its independence will be of little
value in the long run, especially in the face of a careful and committed
repressive regime. Without such powers of substantive review of law, policy,
and practice, even the most dedicated and independent of judges can act
only against arbitraryor careless violations of human rights.
Forexample, the South African judiciary has a long tradition of integrity
and independence, but during the course of Nationalist rule its influence
over policy and practice has been steadily diminished through legislation
that legalizes mass and flagrant violations of most human rights. So long as
the government is relatively punctilious, it can circumvent effective judicial
control. In the summer of 1986, to cite but one of many instances, the courts
overturned key emergency legislation, but the government simply redrafted
the measures so as to avoid their earlier technical errors. Similarly, judges
are powerless to prevent-in fact, are required to approve--"judicial" executions (murders)of ordinary citizens and human rights activists.
Likewise, one of the distinctive features of Soviet rule after Stalin has
been the institutionalization of repression through law. As in South Africa,
violations of human rightsoccur less often as the result of procedural irregularities than as an effect of substantive law. Nearly all dissidents in prison
or in exile have been tried and convicted, by the book, of violating duly
promulgated laws. It is the laws themselves that are abusive of human rights.
We contend that the power of substantive review is implicit in the
requirement that courts be impartial and independent. The judiciary must
be able to rule on the human rightsconsequences of any legislation. Nonetheless, the power of substantive review is not a part of most legal systems (it
38. Claude, note 9 above.
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exists only to a limited extent even in Britain and France), and it is not
explicitly required by either the Universal Declaration or the Covenants.
Furthermore,the principal remedy for laws that are violative of human rights,
even in a system whose judiciary possesses the greatest powers of judicial
review, lies not in the internal checks provided by protection rights, but in
the external checks that we have termed "empowerment rights."These are
discussed in the following section.
The limited scope of protection rights, however, should not obscure their
fundamental importance. Infact, it underscores the essential theoretical point
that the protection afforded by the recognition of any human right or group
of rights, no matter how important, is severely limited in the absence of
safeguards for related and equally fundamental rights. Thus, we insist that
all human rights are inherently interdependent and indivisible.
The protection rights of habeas corpus and judicial review are good
proxies for a variety of other legal or civil rights, noted in Table 3 above.
The principle of the rule of law prohibits the use of ex post facto laws.
Together,habeas corpus and an independent judiciary go a long way toward
assuring the availability of legal remedies for violations of rights; an independent judiciary in particular is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for the existence of effective remedies against governmental infringements of rights. Habeas corpus and judicial review are also essential
mechanisms for action against torture and other violations of the rights of
those subject to detention. Furthermore,we are aware of no legal system
where habeas corpus and an independent judiciary are well established but
the presumption of innocence is not generally secured; in practice, governments that widely presume the guilt of those they detain also infringe upon
judicial independence or deny habeas corpus.
We must also note the potential contribution of these protection rights
to the assurance of all the other key rights that we have identified. Without
protection rights, no other rights are secure against infringement by the
modern state; without the internal checks they provide, the enjoyment of
other rights rests on little more than good faith of the government and
whatever external constraints it might face.
Protection rights have a particularly important role in safeguarding the
right to political participation. Persons involved in political activity directed
against, or not approved by, the government are likely to be the principal
targets of the kinds of abuse of governmental power that protection rights
seek to prevent or overturn. By protecting the government's political opponents against most arbitraryabuses of state power, protection rights can
contribute greatly to the creation of a public space for political action.39
39. Compare Richard Kiwanuka, "On the Paucity of Human Rights NGOs in Africa," Human
Rights Internet Reporter 11 (November 1986): 11.
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EMPOWERMENT
RIGHTS
What is lacking so far in our account is any sense of people as active, creative
beings in charge of, or at least struggling to shape, their lives. People must
not simply be protected against attacks by the state or other citizens, they
must be empowered to act and to lead autonomous lives. All the rights
previously discussed are principally passive protections; the individual is
the beneficiary of the right, but not the central actor in the struggle to realize
human rights. This central role for the individual is provided only by empowerment rights. And without positive empowerment, even the rights discussed above are likely to be precarious.
Empowerment rights provide what we referred to above as "external"
checks on state power. The internal checks of protection rights only assure
that irregularprocedures are not used against individuals or groups by the
state. Unless individuals, separately and collectively, are able to shape these
procedures-to set the rules of the game, and not merely be assured that
the rules are applied as written-oppression is still a very real possibility,
as is clearly illustrated in the examples above of the Soviet Union and South
Africa.
We argue that the three central empowerment rights are the rights to
education, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. The key to
social action in defense of rights, in our view, is an educated citizenry, able
TABLE4
Empowerment Rights
Right to

Proxy for

EDUCATION(D26, E13, E14)

Culture (D27, E15)
Minority Culture (C27)
Thought, Conscience, Religion (D18, C18)
Freedom of Opinion (D19, C19)
Political Participation (D21, C25)

FREEPRESS(D19, C19)

Thought, Conscience, Religion (D18, C18)
Freedom of Opinion (D19, C19)
Political Participation (D21, C25)

FREEDOMOF ASSOCIATION
(D20, C22)

Free Trade Unions (D23, E8, C22)
Social Security (D22, E9)
Work (D23, D24, E6, E7)
Assembly (D20, C21)
Thought, Conscience, Religion (D18, C18)
Freedom of Opinion (D19, C19)
Political Participation (D21, C25)

Note: The source of each right in the InternationalBill of Human Rights is indicated in parentheses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E =
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights).
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to spread its ideas and to organize in defense of its rights.40 We do not include
a separate right to take part in government or public affairs, for reasons
discussed at the conclusion of this section.

The Right to Education
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration and Article 13 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognize the right of
everyone to education, including free and compulsory primary education
and access to secondary, technical, and higher education on the basis of
merit and, to the extent possible, without cost to the student. The right to
attend schools not run by the state is also recognized.
Empowermentrightsare concerned principally with the goals of personal
autonomy and efficacy; they allow the individual to determine the shape
and direction of his or her life. Education provides much of the basic intellectual capacity that enables the individual to think seriously and critically
about what it means to live a good life; to examine and appraise actions,
institutions and ideas; and to choose a course of action on the basis of such
appraisals.
Schools are often used as an instrument of social control rather than
personal liberation, as a mechanism to enforce intellectual conformity rather
than foster creativity and autonomy. Nonetheless, there is the potential for
subversion in even highly coercive and controlled systems of education, as
is illustrated by the disproportionate representation of the relatively well
educated among political dissidents in North, South, East, and West alike.
No matterhow controlled the curriculum, the skills developed in educational
institutions can be applied to the development of ideas other than those
sanctioned by the state.
Beyond the liberating potential of education, we have chosen the right
to education as a key measure of national human rightsperformance because
of its links to other empowerment rights. Freedom of the press, and the
political empowerment for which it stands, is made far more significant by
education; education creates an audience capable of being informed and
mobilized and is absolutely essential to those who would write. Education
similarly magnifies the possibilities for and the impact of trade unions and
other associations. We will return to these points below.
The right to education can be crucial to creating a private space for
intellectual autonomy, especially where schools not controlled by the state
are easily accessible. As discussed above, the potential for education to be
40. Compare RobertJustinGoldstein, Political Repression in 19th CenturyEurope (Beckenham,
Kent: Croom Helm, 1983); and David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983): 35-36.

236

HUMANRIGHTSQUARTERLY

Vol. 10

used in criticism of the state can be greatly enhanced when education is
under the control of the family. Conversely, education can be a way to
strengthen and protect membership rights. This mutual reinforcement is
characteristic of all the empowerment rights.
At minimum, the right to education would guarantee to all access to
the skills and knowledge needed for full membership in society. Forexample,
in the contemporary world one cannot fully participate in society (or the
types of participation available are seriously restricted) if one is illiterate.
More broadly, one's options are limited if one does not have access to the
cultural models, forms, examples, and information of the society: for example, the accent and idiom, the cultural and historical points of reference,
and the norms of civility of the dominant or mainstream groups in society.41
In modern and modernizing societies, formal education is usually the standard way to acquire such essential skills and information.
Education also increases one's opportunities to take part in the cultural
life of a society, and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, important
rights recognized in Article 15 of the InternationalCovenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. In fact, the link between education and these
cultural rights is so close that we would argue that in most instances the
rightto education, combined with family rightsand the rightto nondiscrimination, provides a reliable indicator of their status.
Education can also make importantcontributions to social mobility and
thus to combatting class-based discrimination. In developing countries there
is substantial evidence to show that even basic literacy contributes substantially to an individual's integration into a modern economy and to his or
her ability to take advantage of the opportunities it offers.42And in almost
all countries, education is one of the few ways for a poor child to move
rapidly up the social ladder. This is true even in countries with strong class
or status hierarchies;even taking into account problems of differentialaccess,
education is likely to be one of the few resources available that will allow
one to break into or through the hierarchy.
Finally, education can be important even to the protection of survival
rights. An effective health care system requires that people be aware of
public health dangers. Disseminating information, for example, on methods
for treating or avoiding parasite-infested water, is much easier and cheaper
if the public is literate. Similarly, technical improvements in agricultural
methods, which can increase food production, are more easily disseminated
to the literate. As Frances Steward puts it, "education is an importantfactor
in determining [basic needs satisfaction] at all income levels."43
41. See, for example, Richard Rodriguez, Hunger of Memory: The Education of Richard Rodriguez (Boston: D. R. Godine, 1983).
42. ChristopherColclough, "The Impact of PrimarySchooling on Economic Development: A
Review of the Evidence," World Development 10 (March 1982): 167-186.
43. Frances Steward, Basic Needs in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985): 96.

1988

AssessingPerformance

237

Freedom of the Press
Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration, which are closely paralleled
by the same articles of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recognize
a cluster of rights that we will argue can be largely subsumed under the
right to freedom of the press.
Everyonehasthe rightto freedomof thought,conscience and religion;this right
includesfreedomto change his religionor belief, and freedom,eitheralone or
in communitywith othersand in public or private,to manifesthis religionor
belief in teaching,practice,worshipand observance.
Everyonehas the rightto freedomof opinionand expression;this rightincludes
freedomto hold opinionswithoutinterferenceand to seek, receive and impart
informationand ideas throughany media and regardlessof frontiers.
These rights give considerable substance to the abstract idea of intellectual autonomy discussed above. One may think whatever one wants.
One may hold whatever opinion one wants. And one may freely express
one's thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. Furthermore,one is free to manifest
his or her religious beliefs individually and collectively, both in private and
in public.
As we noted above, education helps to give force and practical meaning
to these freedoms by providing resources with which one may form or
develop, rather than just receive, beliefs and opinions. The freedoms of
thought, conscience, religion, belief, and opinion protect the fruits of intellectual autonomy, which is the goal of the right to education. And the right
to a free press, understood broadly as a rightto freedom of expression through
any medium, allows one to begin to act on these beliefs. Words, expressed
in public, often are the first step towards deeds. Thus, we would argue that
the rightsto freedom of conscience, religion, belief, and opinion can largely
be subsumed under the right to education, insofar as they represent intellectual empowerment, and under the rights to a free press and freedom of
association, insofar as they represent political empowerment.
Freedom of the press44 allows one to advocate one's ideas and thus
attempt to see them realized. Freedom of expression is of little value if those
who wish to express their ideas are denied access to either publicly or
privately owned channels of communication. There is no real freedom of
expression if one is prevented from speaking to one's target audience, or at
least those who wish to hear; those without access to the media are not
really free to express their views. Similarly, those who are denied access to
44. Ourconcentrationon the press,andthuson publicspeechto the generalneglectof private
speech, can be furtherjustifiedby the factthatwe are awareof no governmentthatallows
publicexpressionof beliefsor opinionsbutcontrolsthe privateexpressionof those beliefs
or opinions(althoughmanydo allow privateexpressionsthat are prohibitedor severely
controlledin public).
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the views of others do not really enjoy the freedom to hold opinions without
interference.
Clearly, then, a free press is also crucial to the rightto political participation. In particular,a free press is essential to effective political action aimed
at effecting changes in government or its policies. Whether that action involves electoral politics or helps to put pressure on decision-makers with
respect to a particularpolicy or decision, the closing of the media precludes
virtually all but a small elite with direct access to the government from
having a significant political impact.
Finally, freedom of the press can be crucial to ensuring respect for all
other rights:by publicizing actions of the state it helps to mobilize advocates
of change. Violations of human rights are less likely to occur or to continue
if they can be effectively publicized, and less likely to begin if the violator
knows that his actions may become widely known. This is especially true
where state action is subject to review by an independent judiciary. Conversely, even an independent judiciary is likely to be hamstrung where the
flow of information is tightly controlled. We also note that responsible governments are likely to find a free press an invaluable source of information
about popular views of their policies.
Freedom of Association
The rightto freedom of association, recognized in Article 20 of the Universal
Declaration and Article 22 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
entails the right to form associations; to formulate association policies and
make them known; and to use legitimate tactics such as public assembly,
recourse to the press, and the formation of political parties to exert pressure
upon the state to adopt particularpolicies. Thus, under freedom of association, we group the rights to free trade unions, freedom of assembly, and
political associations such as political parties (although a rightto form political parties is not explicitly mentioned in either the Universal Declaration or
the Covenants).
In the industrialized world, free trade unions are perhaps the most important manifestation of the rightto freedom of association. Union activities
on behalf of workers' interests are often essential to the effective protection
of economic rights. But trade unions perform an equally important political
function, through direct participation in the electoral process (e.g., the Trade
Union Congress' central role in the BritishLabourParty),indirect but regular
political linkages (e.g., the close association between many liberal Democrats
and the AFL-CIOin the United States), and as an organized social force
outside of government, a role that was especially important in nineteenth
and early twentieth century Europe in bringing about the rise of the welfare
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state. The potential political power of organized labor is underscored by the
extensive repression of workers' organizations in the United States and Canada well into the twentieth century,45and in the Soviet bloc right up to the
present, as the example of Solidarity so vividly indicates.
In the nonindustrialized world as well, trade unions are increasingly
importantpolitical organizations, despite the fact that many are incorporated
into state structures, as in, for example, Mexico or Tanzania.46 Literate,
centralized, and organizationally crucial workers in primary industries and
services can bring entire economies to a standstill, even in countries where
85 percent of the population still lives off the land.
In addition to trade unions, peasants' unions and other free economic
associations have a key role to play in the nonindustrialized world, even
though their organization is much more difficult, given the dispersed nature
of peasant populations and the lower rates of literacy among rural peoples.
During the short political thaw in China in 1978 through 1979, peasants
from isolated, extremely poverty-strickenhinterlandareas suddenly appeared
in the capital demanding to be heard. The speed of the crackdown against
them and other politically active groups, especially students, revealed the
government's fear of real protest.47Similarly, literate peasants in Guatemala
have been special targets of government terror.48
The political, at times even revolutionary, potential of organizations
formed initially to effect economic change not only underscores the artificiality of the distinction between economics and politics, but indicates that
political empowerment is implicit in the right to freedom of association.
Freedom of association protects any voluntary organization that mediates
between citizen and state, and thus helps to insulate individuals from the
power of the state. More importantly, people acting in concert have more
strength to resist state action than individuals acting alone, even in great
number.
Human rights are protected in practice in state societies only through
the constant political involvement of a large number of groups, most of
which are concerned only with particular rights and interests pertinent to
their own situations. These include communal or ethnic organizations, such

45. RobertJustinGoldstein, Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to the Present
(Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1978), chap. 1; and Thomas Berger, Fragile Freedoms:
Human Rights and Dissent in Canada (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1982): chap. 5.
46. Peter Worsley, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1984): 226-27; and Rhoda E. Howard, "Third World Trade Unions as
Agencies of Human Rights:The Case of Commonwealth Africa," in Trade Unions and the
New Industrializationof the Third World, ed. Roger Southall (London: Zed Press, 1988).
47. Liang Heng and JudithShapiro, After the Nightmare: A Survivorof the Cultural Revolution
Reports on China Today (New York: Knopf, 1986).
48. Bowen, note 10 above.

240

HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY

Vol. 10

as caste associations in India; religious institutions and organizations, and
"base communities" and other groups associated with "liberation theology"
in LatinAmerica; women's groups; and other groups. Most associations act
on behalf of limited constituencies. Buttogether they have a common interest
in freedom of association, and through that, political participation. A state
that protects freedom of association, therefore, protects the right of many
diverse groups of citizens to enter and influence the political arena.
Freedom of association is a good proxy not only for the rightto political
participation, but also for the right to work, which we understand as not
merely the right to earn a wage, but the ability to choose and to influence
the conditions of one's labor. In our view, the rightto work requires freedom
of association for workers. Inthe Soviet Union, for example, jobs are officially
guaranteed, but in practice they are contingent on political conformity:
political dissidents, unauthorized artists, musicians and writers, Jews seeking
to emigrate, and evangelical Christiansare regularlydeprived of professional
positions and assigned to menial tasks-or worse; the rightto work for some
Soviets means only the right to toil in slave labor camps.
The right to work should be the right to find satisfying work, under
conditions that are not intrinsically uncomfortable, displeasing, or exploitative, not merely the right to labor for a wage. The right to work ought to
include the right to make use of one's creative capacities, not merely the
right to supply labor power to the endeavors of others. But workers tend to
be regarded merely as human capital, exploitable and reducible to their
intellectual and/or muscular capacities, unless they have free trade unions
to defend their interests-which brings us back to the political dimensions
of freedom of association. The right to work may protect one and one's
family against economic deprivation; if satisfying work is available, it may
even contribute to a sense of personal worth and achievement. But without
a right to organize in order to shape the conditions and terms of labor, and
ultimately the socioeconomic structure of society, it is inadequate.
Freedom of association is also a good proxy for several other rights, as
indicated in Table 4. Governments which permit free and politically active
trade unions, as well as other types of organizations, are more likely to grant
social security rights. For example, in nineteenth century Europe, welfare
rights were obtained only after workers had the legal and real capacity to
organize.49 Freedom of assembly consists largely of the right to associate,
on a regular or irregularbasis, in public. Public demonstrations can have a
powerful political impact, as illustratedby the Philippines in 1986 and South
Korea in 1987. And, like freedom of the press, one of the principal uses of
the freedom of association is likely to be to support and defend the freedoms
of thought, conscience, religion, and opinion.
49. Goldstein, note 39 above.
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Political Participation and Multiparty Systems
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of our short list of rights is the absence
of the rightto political participation,or, as Article 21 of the Universal Declaration puts it, "the right to take part in the government of his country, directly
or through freely chosen representatives."The rightto electoral participation
in particular is explicitly included in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration
and Article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nonetheless,
despite our emphasis on empowerment rights,we have not included political
participation as a key right, both because of the extreme ideological controversyover the meaning of this rightand because it is likely to be redundant
if the rights to a free press and freedom of association, along with the
protection rights to habeas corpus and an independent judiciary, are respected. We contend that the substance of the rightto political participation
is better encompassed by the four protection and empowerment rights identified above than by the vague, controversial, and relatively easily abused
notion of "free elections," or, as the Covenant puts it, "genuine periodic
elections."
What is a "free" or "genuine" election? Consider the following cases.
In El Salvador in 1985 all citizens were required to vote in a fairly open
contest between the center and the right, but with the principal leftist party
excluded by law. Abstention, however, was likely to be considered by the
police, the military,or the death squads to be a sign of disloyalty. In Nicaragua
at roughly the same time the parties of the rightchose to boycott the election,
but opposition parties that did participate were able to garner roughly a third
of the vote.so In most of the Soviet bloc countries, voting is compulsory and
voters are asked simply to approve party-selected candidates. In Kenyaduring
the 1970s, despite a de facto one party political system, significant numbers
of unpopular incumbents were turned out of office."5 In the United States
today, elections are completely free but in practice one has a choice between
center and center-right parties; there is no viable leftist or even socialdemocratic, option. In Senegal in the late seventies, voters were offered
choices among candidates from three, but only three, state-sanctioned parties, which were required by law to represent particular ideological viewpoints.52Inthe Philippines, all elected Presidents, including Corazon Aquino,
have come from two families.53
All of these elections have been called free and genuine by their supporters and shams by their detractors-and there is at least a kernel of truth
50. LiisaLukkariNorth, "ElSalvador,"in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above; and Gander,
note 19 above.
51. Howard, note 36 above, 139.
52. Martin Klein, "Senegal," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above.
53. Claude, note 9 above.
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in each characterization. Therefore, given the seemingly unavoidable controversy surrounding the definition of "genuine periodic elections" in the
contemporary world, and the feasibility of effectively protecting the right to
political participation through protection of the rights to habeas corpus, a
free press, freedom of association, and the preservation of an independent
judiciary, we do not include in our short list a separate right to electoral
participation.
A brief comment on the rightto multipartyelections is probably in order,
though, given the emphasis placed on this rightby well-known organizations
such as Freedom House, and by many other groups in the West, particularly
those on the political right. It is importantto note that neither the Universal
Declaration nor the Covenants include or even imply a right to multiparty
elections. There is also a serious danger of rigid formalism in relying on
such a measure of political rights and participation.
We agree that, all other things being equal, an open, multiparty, competitive system allows for more genuine political participation than a no
partyor a one partysystem. Likewise, a multipartysystem in which no parties
are excluded from participating allows for more genuine political participation than one in which some are excluded by law. In a multipartysystem,
it is possible for voters to oust the government and substitute a new set of
leaders. In a one party system, even one which allows a genuine choice of
candidates, replacement of the government is not possible.
Nevertheless, one party systems can allow for greater or lesser degrees
of political participation. Ideological conformity may be either required or
irrelevant; candidates for office may be nominated either from above or by
local committees; there may be several candidates, or only one, for the office
of president.54Mexico is a good example of a de facto one party state in
which opponents and the interests they represent are usually (although not
always) coopted into the party, which is defined less in ideological than
organizational terms. The relatively open or closed natureof an official ruling
party in a noncompetitive system must be considered in any serious evaluation of the extent of political participation.
Moreover, real multiparty political competition is not possible without
the prior establishment of other rights. This is especially relevant to the
evaluation of the human rightsrecords of newly emerging ThirdWorld states.
In Uganda, for example, the central human rights objective is to restore the
most basic right of life. It may be that the only successful way to do this, in
a severely fragmented society, is through the formation of a single ruling
party incorporating elements from all regional and ethnic groups. The presence of competitive political parties can be a mere cover for intra-elite
factional infighting in societies in which the majority of the people are still
54. Howard, note 36 above, 140-144.
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TABLE
5
Other Rights
A. InternationalOrder
ALIENS(C13)
ASYLUM(D14)
MOVEMENT(D13, C12)
NATIONALITY
(D15)
ORDER (D28)
INTERNATIONAL
B. Property
PROPERTY(D17)
C. Self-Determination
SELF-DETERMINATION
(El, C1)
Note: The source of each right in the International Bill of Human Rights is indicated in parentheses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E =
InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights).

illiterate and disorganized and perceive politics mainly as patron-client relations. Nigerian regional politics is a case in point.
The formal existence of multiple political parties in and of itself does
not assure effective implementation of the right to political participation.
Thus, both for reasons of economy and in order to avoid interpretative
controversies of a sort that attach to none of our other key rights, we close
our list of rights at ten and exclude the rightto a multipartypolitical system.
OTHERAND ANOMALOUS RIGHTS
We have subsumed most of the major rightsin the InternationalBill of Human
Rights under the ten rights discussed above. Nonetheless, a few remain
unaccounted for, either in whole or in part. These fall into three groups: a
set of five rights pertaining to nonnationals within the structure of international society; the right to property; and the right of peoples to self-determination. These rightsalso seem to have proved troublesome for the drafters
of the International Bill of Human Rights: of the seven, four are in the
Universal Declaration but not the Covenants, while two are in the Covenants
but not the Declaration; only one is in both.
Human Rights Beyond the Nation-State
Most substantive articles in the Declaration and the Covenants are intended
to have universal application, and begin with phrases such as "All human
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being are . . . ", "Everyone has the right to . . . ", "No one shall be ... "
In fact, though, there is an underlying assumption that these provisions
regulate relations between citizens and their governments, reflecting the
state-centric nature of contemporary world politics and international law.55
This state-centrism is evident in the absence of an internationalauthority
for the implementation and enforcement of international human rights instruments.56States accept rather grand obligations to implement the rights
enumerated in the Covenants, but for the most part each state government
is the sole authoritativejudge of the adequacy of its efforts. The enforcement
of human rights norms rests largely on national, not international, action.
State-centrism is even more evident in the fact that almost all rights can
be denied to nonnationals. Forexample, the derogation of economic, social,
and cultural rights in the developing countries is explicitly permitted by
Article 2(3) of the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. Article 13 of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits the expulsion of even
lawfully resident aliens, so long as the expulsion is carried out according to
law and the alien is permitted the opportunity to present arguments against
the expulsion. In addition, although both Covenants prohibit discrimination
on the basis of national or social origin, they do not prohibit discrimination
on the basis of citizenship or legal nationality.
Nonetheless, the explicit exemption of developing countries from the
obligation to extend economic and social rightsto nonnationals implies that
developed countries are not at liberty to deny these rights to nonnationals,
or at least to those lawfully in their territory. In addition, aliens can argue
for protection under the manifest meaning of international human rights
provisions that are formulated to apply to "Everyone ... " or "All persons.
.."., Thus, the Human RightsCommittee, the independent body of experts
that monitors compliance with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
has held that aliens are entitled to all the rights in the Covenant except those
explicitly restricted to citizens or some other group.58The general thrust of
55. R. J.Vincent, Human Rightsand InternationalRelations (Cambridge:Cambridge University
Press [for the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1986): 150-52; and Richard Falk,
"Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights,"in Human Rightsand State Sovereignty (New
York: Holmes and Meier, 1980).
56. See Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," International Organization 40 (Summer 1986): 599-642; and Egon Schwelb and Philip Alston, "The
Principal Institutionsand Other Bodies Founded Under the Charter,"in The International
Dimensions of Human Rights,ed. KarelVasak and Philip Alston (Westport,CT:Greenwood
Press, 1982).
57. Such an argument is strongly reinforced by the presence in other articles of alternative
words clearly intended to exclude aliens: for example, Article 25 of the Civil and Political
Covenant extends political rights (only) to "Everycitizen . . " and Article 12's protection
of freedom of movement and residence applies only to "Everyone lawfully within the
territoryof a State," thus explicitly excluding illegal aliens from this protection.
58. Human Rights Committee, Report of the Human Rights Committee [1986], UN document
number A/41/40: 117-19. Compare Richard B. Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in
Contemporary International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
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the idea of nondiscrimination also seems to require the extension of full
protection to aliens.
The ambiguous position of aliens, however, is underscored by the restriction of the right to freedom of movement to those lawfully within a
state's territoryby Article 12 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This clearly implies a state's right to restrictthe entry of any nonnational it
wishes (except perhaps if the restriction rests on prohibited grounds for
discrimination). Similarly, Article 12(2), (4) of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights explicitly guarantees to individuals the right to leave any
country, but to enter only one's own country.59The exclusion of non nationals
is subject to even fewer limitations than their expulsion.60The only restriction
on the state's rightto exclude nonnationals is embodied in the rightof asylum,
recognized in Article 14 of the Declaration (but not in the Covenants).
The only provision in the entire International Bill of Human Rights that
clearly is not restrictedto a state's treatment of its own citizens is Article 28
of the Universal Declaration: "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized." The most plausible reading of Article 28 is as an
"elastic cause," to justify future extensions of new rights. As such, it is not
surprisingthat it was not included in the Covenants, which unambiguously
impose international legal obligations and establish nationally justiciable
rights; it is extremely rare for lawmaking treaties to include such elastic
provisions, which to most states seem extraordinarilydangerous due to the
unpredictabilityof their application. This is especially true since the reference
to international order might imply unspecified limitations on sovereignty.
Taken seriously, it might lead to the acceptance of human rights obligations
and, in particular,economic obligations to other states and the international
community. Such obligations are scrupulously avoided almost everywhere
else in the International Bill of Human Rights.
The struggle for a new InternationalEconomic Order or other obligatory
mechanisms for the redistribution of international resources has given salience to Article 28 of the International Bill of Human Rights. It is certainly
true that some impediments to the realization of human rights lie in the
current international political and economic order-even if, as we have
argued above, the principal impediments are national. But Article 28 is too
vague, too controversial, and too much contraryto the restof the Declaration
and the Covenants to bear much weight. Nonetheless, it does address a set
of problems largely outside the current state-centric framework of international human rights norms, and thus suggests a potentially important area
for the further development of those norms.
59. See also UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/10.
60. Compare Animesh Ghoshal and Thomas M. Crowley, "Refugees and Immigrants:A Human
Rights Dilemma," Human Rights Quarterly 5 (August 1983): 327-347.
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Human rights are the rights of each and every individual, simply as a
human being. To make the realization and protection of these rights dependent on such arbitraryfeatures as place of birthor the nationality of one's
parents seems morally unjustifiable. Even it if is admitted that states are, and
are likely to remain, the primary focus of whatever international order we
have-that is, even if we allow that state-centrism is an internationalpolitical
fact to which even human rights norms must bend-it seems inappropriate
to allow any of the fundamental structuresof international order to interfere
actively with the universal realization of human rights. Perhaps Article 28
reflects a glimmer of such concerns. In general, however, state-centrism is
overwhelmingly dominant in the International Bill of Human Rights.
The fifthand final anomalous right in this group is the rightto nationality,
another right found in the Declaration (Article 15) but not the Covenants.
In a world structured around sovereign states, the right to nationality is an
essential minimum guarantee of membership in some society, and thus in
the society of states. The right to nationality, along with the right to enter
one's own country, assures that there is at least one place from which each
person cannot be excluded. In a world of states, the stateless person is
everywhere an outsider:6' as human beings, the stateless are entitled to all
human rights, but no state takes responsibility to protect their rights, nor do
they necessarily have the right to live in any country of the world.62
The Right to Property
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration reads: "1. Everyone has the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall
be arbitrarilydeprived of his property." Similar provisions were discussed
during the drafting of the Covenants, but in the end were not included
because of an inability to achieve consensus on their formulation.
We advocate a limited rightto property, but reject any attempt to attach
the right to property to nonhuman entities such as business corporations.
We would also subordinate any right to property to other human rights, in
particularthe right to food and the right to work not merely for a wage, but
also under safe working conditions and at labor suitable for a human being.
At the same time, however, we are aware of the abuses of individual workers
and peasants that occur when private ownership is converted into public
(state) ownership, especially in otherwise repressive societies. State own61. Compare Dorothy Jean Walker, "Statelessness: Violation or Conduit for Violation of Human
Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 3 (February1981): 106-123.
62. Although Article 24 of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights states that
"every child has the right to acquire a nationality," in practice many children do not; for
example, persons of Lebanese origin born in Sierra Leone, where citizenship is granted
only to those of "negro-African"descent (Howard, note 36 above, 101) or ethnic Koreans
born in Japan,who are legally aliens even if their families have lived in Japanfor generations
(Iwasawa, note 31 above).
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ership and management of productive property is not necessarily a better
protector of the rightsto food and to work-or any other rights-than private
capitalist ownership.
Thus, we argue for the right to property under limited conditions: no
individual or family should be deprived, either by private citizens, corporate
entities, or the state, of the property that he or she, or the household unit,
may own or control in order to produce food or an individual or household
income. Nevertheless, we realize that even this principle cannot be translated
into a hard and fast rule; for example, a family-held corporation or plantation
could provide the family's sole source of income while employing thousands
of workers in exploitative conditions.
The right to property should be accepted, but as an individual human
(not corporate or state) right. Furthermore,there should be no human right
(although, depending on the circumstances, there may be justifiable legal
rights)to private ownership of means of production used for the sustenance
of large numbers of other people.
Self-Determ ination
Both Covenants, in Article 1, declare that "all peoples have the rightto selfdetermination" and the right to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources." This right is anomalous because it is the only right in the entire
International Bill of Human Rights that is a right of "peoples"-meaning
states in practice-not individuals. Academic commentators occasionally
argue for a right of individual self-determination, but such a right, besides
being obscure and extravagant, is not widely recognized, as demonstrated
by the words of the Covenants. Furthermore,the "peoples" who are entitled
to self-determination, according to accepted international practice, are only
those currently or previously under colonial domination. The right to selfdetermination of nationalities or groups within established sovereign states
is, for obvious reasons, strongly opposed by virtually all states.63
For people under foreign or colonial rule, self-determination is an important right. Normally, individuals prefer to be ruled by their "own kind"
ratherthan by foreigners or outsiders. Self-determination in this sense is an
aspect of human dignity: the knowledge that one's own people rule one's
own country generates a sense of efficacy and pride.
But self-determination has no meaning as a human right,as distinct from
an international legal right, if individuals are given no right to participate in
their own governance, if they do not act as subjects determining their own
lives, ratherthan mere objects of (independent) state policies. The millions
of refugees fleeing their "own" countries are ample evidence that many
63. Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine of the
United Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The
Legitimacy of Self-determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
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people would ratherlive in security with strangersthan in their "own" nationstates as victimized citizens. Homegrown oppressors may be preferable to
foreign ones, but true self-determination requires autonomous political participation for all individuals. Self-determination, even for peoples ratherthan
individuals, means more than a right to local despots.
Self-determination is undoubtedly an important right, but as it is formulated in the Covenants it is at best an anomaly, and at worst not a human
right at all but rather an international legal right of states. As it is interna-

tionallyinterpreted,it is irrevelantas a protectionof individualsagainsttheir
own governments; worse, it is often used an an ideological tool for justifying,
and deflecting outside criticism of, the abuse of citizens' human rights.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that ten key rights, taken together, can be used as proxies
for almost the entire list of rights in the International Bill of Human Rights.
This particularlist certainly can be debated. Forexample, some commentators64WOuldprefer to include the right to work. Others might argue that it
is redundant to include both the right to an independent judiciary and the
rightto habeas corpus, or both the rightto food and the rightto health care.
Our views on these matters are not cast in stone. We recognize the preliminary nature of this analysis.
Nevertheless, we consider it useful to open the debate, and believe that
our initial effort here may be both theoretically and heuristically valuable.
Any analysis of the protection or abuse of rights-or indeed of the policy
issues raised by a commitment to human rights-must make some choices,
implicit or explicit, about the right upon which to focus. It is time that we
confront directly the issues involved in such a choice.
The next step is to take this (or a similar) framework and put it to use
in empirical research. We hope to begin doing so ourselves in the near
future, and hope that other social scientists will pursue similar or parallel
lines of research.
Useful data for most of our key rights already exist or could be made
available from existing public data sources. We would particularly like to
see the creation of a public data bank based on this or a similar list of key
rights. It is also important that alternative strategies for using such data be
tried and evaluated. These might range from large-scale, crossnational, aggregate data analysis to matched-pair comparisons involving qualitative as
well as quantitative data, and should include a variety of intermediate and
mixed approaches as well. Such work should bring us one step closer to
understanding the causes of respect for, and abuse of, human rights.
64. Forexample,Skalnesand Egeland,note 2 above.

